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ABSTRACT
Group discussions are a way for individuals to exchange ideas and
arguments in order to reach better decisions than they could on their
own. One of the premises of productive discussions is that better
solutions will prevail, and that the idea selection process is medi-
ated by the (relative) competence of the individuals involved. How-
ever, since people may not know their actual competence on a new
task, their behavior is influenced by their self-estimated compe-
tence — that is, their confidence — which can be misaligned with
their actual competence.
Our goal in this work is to understand the effects of confidence-
competence misalignment on the dynamics and outcomes of dis-
cussions. To this end, we design a large-scale natural setting, in
the form of an online team-based geography game, that allows us
to disentangle confidence from competence and thus separate their
effects.
We find that in task-oriented discussions, the more-confident in-
dividuals have a larger impact on the group’s decisions even when
these individuals are at the same level of competence as their team-
mates. Furthermore, this unjustified role of confidence in the decision-
making process often leads teams to under-perform. We explore
this phenomenon by investigating the effects of confidence on con-
versational dynamics. For example, we take up the question: do
more-confident people introduce more ideas than the less-confident,
or do they introduce the same number of ideas but their ideas get
more uptake? Moreover, we show that the language people use
is more predictive of a person’s confidence level than their actual
competence. This also suggests potential practical applications,
given that in many settings, true competence cannot be assessed be-
fore the task is completed, whereas the conversation can be tracked
during the course of the problem-solving process.
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1. INTRODUCTION
It is hard to argue with Griffin and Tversky’s [15] opening state-
ment, “The weighing of evidence and the formation of belief are
basic elements of human thought”.1 Griffin and Tversky go on to
say that one of the major findings from psychology, philosophy and
statistics regarding how to evaluate evidence and assess confidence
is that “people”, ranging from the ordinary to the expert, “are often
more confident in their judgments than is warranted by the facts”.2
At the same time, many studies have also found underconfidence
to be rampant, as well; for an entry into that literature, see Erev et
al. [12], or, for an intriguingly titled study, [27]. Thus, confidence
and competence are often misaligned.3
What effect does this misalignment of confidence and compe-
tence have on
(a) group decision-making, and
(b) the dynamics of group discussions?
With respect to (a), for example, who has more influence on the
group’s decision: those who are overconfident but under-competent,
or those who are competent but less confident? Similarly, with re-
spect to (b): do the overconfident but under-competent tend to dom-
inate the entire conversation, or do the more-competent eventually
have more say? Studies on (a) [30, 34, 41] have generally shown
that the overconfident have greater clout and that overconfidence
leads to sub-optimal outcomes; but these experiments have been
relatively small in scale or involve simulations. Topic (b) appears
understudied.
In contrast, the work we present in this paper represents a first
investigation into both the conversational and decision-making im-
pact of confidence-competence misalignment at a large scale and
in an online natural setting. Our experimental platform is an on-
line collaborative geography puzzle game that has been played by
over 10,000 teams; in the game, players have potentially different
“views” of a given location and try to determine that location by
pooling their information. The system records each individual’s
guess before they interact with other teammates, each individual’s
confidence in their guess, the entire team conversation, and the ac-
curacy of the final answer that the team settles on. (See Section 2.2
for more details.)
In our data, more than half the users indicate a confidence level
that does not match their competence level, with these miscalibra-
1This is not to say these are all the elements of human thought.
2See also, among others, [22, 23], the latter giving rise to the phrase
“Dunning-Kruger effect”.
3“One of the painful things about our time is that those who feel
certainty are stupid, and those with any imagination and under-
standing are filled with doubt and indecision. I do not think this
is necessary.” — Bertrand Russell
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tion errors being committed both by people with low competence
and by people with high competence. (See Section 3 for more de-
tails.) We thus have a substantial number of instances of under- and
over-confidence to analyze in the context of group decision-making
discussions.
Our findings with respect to point (a) — effects on group decision-
making — are that: beyond competence, confidence gives people
additional control over team decisions (Section 4.1). While this
result is in line with those of [41], we additionally explicitly exam-
ine the impact of degrees of confidence differences between group
members, controlling for correctness. We see that when the most
competent individual in a team is less confident than the least com-
petent one, the team generally performs worse compared to teams
with the same composition in terms of correctness but in which in-
dividuals have accurate confidence estimates. This suggests that
teams where misalignment exists between individuals’ relative con-
fidence and relative competence fail to reach their potential in terms
of performance (Section 4.2).
We are thus naturally led to delve into the novel research topic (b)
— the interplay between confidence and the dynamics of group
discussions — to help understand what happens in a group con-
versation that leads to the effects just described. For instance,
we examine the role confidence plays in the idea-selection pro-
cess: do more-confident people introduce more ideas than the less-
confident, or do they introduce the same number of ideas but their
ideas get more uptake? We find that in fact, more-confident individ-
uals tend to introduce more ideas in discussions, even when there
are not any more competent than their teammates (Section 4.3).
Finally, as a practical contribution, we show that there are lin-
guistic cues that are predictive of a person’s confidence level, sug-
gesting that interfaces for group decision-making could potentially
make use of confidence information to help in the collaboration
process (Section 5).
Terminological note: from “competence” to “correctness”. The
term “competence” is used in the related psychology literature to
indicate a person’s actual observed performance in a given task,
and we would have preferred to be consistent with that literature.
However, in this paper, we are discussing both “confidence” and
“competence”, and the two words unfortunately (and perhaps iron-
ically) sound so similar as to potentially introduce confusion. We
therefore use the term “correctness” instead of “competence” in
most of the remainder of this paper.
2. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
2.1 Large-scale online discussion setting
To study the role confidence plays in the dynamics of online
discussions and decision-making processes, we need a natural set-
ting where we can gather participants’ confidence labels and ob-
serve details of the group decision-making process. With these con-
straints in mind, we design an experimental platform in the guise of
an online team-based world exploration game, StreetCrowd [31].4
StreetCrowd is played in teams of at least two players, and is
built around a geographic puzzle: the system chooses some spot on
Earth, and players are given access (only) to ground-level Google
StreetView images of that spot, which they can navigate to try to
determine where the spot is. Each game consists of two stages:
4This game has been approved by the Cornell University’s
IRB (Protocol 1504005555) and is currently live at http://
streetcrowd.us/start; an unaffiliated gameplay video is available
at https://youtu.be/Lp47w-lWsn0.
Table 1: Excerpt from a chat during the team phase. The true
answer for this puzzle is France. Player 1 has guessed the coun-
try correctly, but is only sure the location is in Europe. Player
2 and 3 guessed New Zealand and Nepal respectively. During
the chat, players attempt to convince each other, while mak-
ing intermediate team marker placements during the process.
In this example, player 1 tried to persuade the team to guess
France whereas the other two players argued for New Zealand.
player 1: its in the alps somewheres
player 2: Crazy amount of sheep
player 2: I put new zealand
player 3: my sources say no
player 1: well maintained mnt road says europe
player 2: good point
player 3: new zealand is good shout
player 2: the land looks a bit arid though
player 2: thats why i thought nz
player 1: well NZ is like europe in that way
but dont notice any of their typical vegitation
player 3: nepal
player 2: I think the road is too nice to be in nepal
player 1 has moved the team marker [to France]
· · · · · ·
player 2: and yeah, nz is like europe but not in europe lol
player 2: lol
player 2 has moved the team marker [to New Zealand]
· · · · · ·
• Solo phase – exploration but no discussion. There is no
communication between players at this stage. Each player
has three minutes to independently explore the surrounding
environment and find information that may help them lo-
cate the spot, e.g., geographical landmarks, apparent climate,
whether cars drive on the left-hand or the right-hand side of
the road, and so on. The player makes an individual guess by
placing a marker on an interactive world map. To proceed to
the team phase, the player is prompted for a reason (in a few
words and a confidence level for her guess.
• Team phase – discussion but no exploration. At this
point, further navigation is disabled, but players in a team are
placed in a chat room where they exchange ideas and opin-
ions in an attempt to decide on a single team guess. They
have access to a shared map and to a marker that each one of
them can move. When all players have agreed on the posi-
tion of the marker on the map, or the time limit is reached, the
game ends. (See Table 1 for an example team discussion.)
In this setting, we can generate a virtually infinite number of
puzzles with known correct answer — the location Ltrue used to
generate the respective StreetView. We can also directly measure
how correct a guess G is based on the the distance to the true loca-
tion dist(G,Ltrue) (we use great-circle distance). We also record a
discrete level of correctness based on how precise the guess is: we
use reverse geocoding to compare the coarse geographical location
of the guess with that of the correct answer (e.g., do they both fall
in the same country?), and categorize guesses into the four levels
of correctness, which we call guess precision, depicted in Table 2.
Table 2: Numerical correctness levels based on guess precision.
guess precision correctness level
wrong continent 1
correct continent, wrong country 2
correct country, wrong region 3
correct region 4
Table 3: Possible choices for self-estimating guess precision and
corresponding numerical confidence levels. For validation, we
also show average zoom levels used by players declaring the
respective confidence levels. (At zoom level 1, the entire world
is displayed, whereas at zoom level 10, players are looking at
roughly the city level.)
estimated precision confidence level zoom level
“Could be anywhere” 1 4.3
“I know the continent!” 2 4.6
“I know the country!!” 3 5.4
“I know the region!!!” 4 7.8
Over the past year, StreetCrowd has accumulated nearly 12,600
team games (comprising about 30,000 individual-phase games) in-
volving more than 5,800 unique players. We discard games in
which individual players fail to make a guess, the team does not
agree on a final guess, or no communication occurs. We also heuris-
tically filter out games that may involve cheating and games for
which we could not identify the coarse location of a player’s guess
automatically.
2.2 Measuring confidence
Studies of confidence in the psychology literature have largely
considered three possible operationalizations of confidence [28]:
1. Confidence as a self-estimation of (a concrete measure of)
performance, that is, how well one did or will do. Examples
include a student’s estimate of her score on an exam [5, 8], or
an estimate of the time it takes to finish a particular task [6].
2. Confidence as the level of certainty in one’s answer. This
type of confidence can be extracted by, for example, asking
participants to indicate how sure they are of their answer on
an ordinal scale [29].
3. Confidence as placement of one’s ability relative to others.
Studies that use this definition of confidence may ask partic-
ipants to estimate their performance percentile with respect
to all the other participants [25], e.g., “top 5%”.
Employing operationalization 1. In our work, we focus on the
first operationalization of confidence, because it concerns a direct
comparison between an individual’s actual performance and her es-
timate of her performance. Misalignment between the two can then
be interpreted in terms of overconfidence — when the individual’s
estimated performance is above her actual performance — and un-
derconfidence — when the estimated performance is under the ac-
tual performance. For instance, player 1 in Table 1 exemplifies un-
derconfidence as she has guessed the correct country, yet she only
estimated her correctness to be at the continent level.
To capture this notion of (over)confidence in StreetCrowd, we
compare guess precision with estimated precision, the four levels
of which are given in Table 3. At the end of the solo phase, play-
ers are prompted to indicate how good they think their guess is
by clicking on one of the four estimated-precision buttons, whose
labels are shown in the leftmost column of Table 3. The correspon-
dence between the correctness levels in Table 2 and confidence lev-
els in Table 3 is deliberate, because the signed difference between
the numerical confidence level and the numerical correctness level
gives us a degree of misalignment: a larger confidence level rela-
tive to correctness level (e.g., “I know the country” but the guess
was really “correct continent, wrong country”) indicates overcon-
fidence; when the confidence level is smaller than the correctness
level, we have underconfidence; the two values being equal indi-
cates correct calibration.
To check if people are indicating their self-evaluated confidence
reasonably — as opposed to clicking randomly or primarily based
on how the buttons are placed in the interface — we compare the
guess-precision levels with how much the users zoomed in on the
map before marking their guess. Higher zoom levels reflect a greater
level of detail. We expect players who believe their guess is more
precise to zoom more, and indeed in our data we do observe that
players with higher confidence levels tend to have higher zoom lev-
els on average (Spearman’s ρ = 0.30, p-value < 0.001, Table 3).5
The other operationalizations. To compare with relevant litera-
ture, in an earlier version of StreetCrowd, we also evaluated confi-
dence according to the second operationalization listed above: how
certain an individual is in her answer. We collected these labels
from about 1,800 games by prompting the individual to indicate
the level of certainty in her guess on a scale from 0% to 100% us-
ing a slider. (We excluded users who did not move the slider at
all.) However, we abandoned this design in favor of the estimated-
precision approach outlined above: offering users the relatively
objective comparison points of continents, countries, and within-
country regions6 was preferable to trying to interpret what, say,
“65%” means or deciding whether one person’s “65%” could defi-
nitely be considered more confident than another person’s “60%”.
In this work we do not consider the third operationalization of
confidence — relative placement among others — which requires
the individuals to jointly consider other people’s correctness as well
as their own, for two reasons: (1) this would require post-hoc sur-
veys of the participants after playing the game, which would be
harder to collect in a natural setting, and (2) it would be hard to
distinguish whether misalignments between estimated and actual
performance are caused by participants misjudging their own abil-
ity, or misjudging the ability of the others.
3. CONFIDENCE MISCALIBRATION
As mentioned in the Introduction, a person’s confidence does not
necessarily align with her actual objective ability. Earlier studies
suggest that this miscalibration follows systematic patterns driven
by the level of competence of the individuals. For instance, several
researchers [23, 29] argue that one needs a certain level of com-
petence in order to reasonably calibrate one’s confidence, and that
as a result, non-competent individuals tend to overestimate their
performance. Indeed, an extensive series of studies from the field
of education dating back to the 1930’s [36] (see [5] for a com-
prehensive survey) consistently indicate that when estimating their
grades, “weak” students tend to overestimate their grades, whereas
“strong” students have a (less pronounced) tendency to underesti-
5We use Spearman’s ρ throughout our study for reporting correla-
tions. Kendall’s τ gives similar qualitative result.
6We take states returned by Google and Bing geocoding services
as regions.
mate their grades. In this section, we use our online setting to ana-
lyze the nature of this systematic bias in confidence miscalibration
in more detail, and at a much larger scale than was previously pos-
sible. This builds the backdrop against which we later examine its
consequences on the dynamics and outcomes of decision-making
discussions.
We examine misalignments with respect to two different com-
mon operationalizations of confidence introduced earlier in Sec-
tion 2.2:
Certainty in one’s answer. For the subset of the data where play-
ers indicated their confidence via a slider, we group players by their
correctness level (as listed in Table 2). For each such correctness
group, we compute the correlation between the actual distances be-
tween each participant’s initial guess and the true location of the
puzzle, dist(G,Ltrue), and their indicated level of confidence. We
find that for players whose location was on the wrong continent,
their self-reported confidence level has no significant correlation
with distance between their guess and the true location (Spearman’s
ρ = -0.006, p-value = 0.88), whereas in contrast, the correlation is
significant for all other better-performing groups. In fact, the cor-
relation is the strongest for the group of players who hit the correct
region (ρ = 0.41, p < 0.001). This confirms that one needs a certain
level of competence to reasonably evaluate one’s performance.
Self-estimation of performance. Since the previous operational-
ization of confidence-as-certainty is not rooted in an objectively
measurable outcome, misalignments cannot be directly translated
into under- or over-confidence. For this reason, for the remainder
of this paper, we operationalize confidence as a self-estimation of
performance, a common interpretation in the psychology and ed-
ucation literature [5, 23, 28]. This allows us to non-ambiguously
map misalignment between the estimated performance and the ac-
tual performance directly to under- and over-confidence.
More than half of the users fail to correctly estimate their per-
formance. Figure 1 breaks this failure down by correctness level,
and shows that indeed, in agreement with [23, 29], individuals that
are more wrong are more likely to overestimate their performance
(blue dashed line), whereas increasing correctness corresponds to
increasing underconfidence.
We note here two experimental limitations that are intrinsic to
any experimental study of confidence misalignment. First, there is
a boundary effect in that individuals achieving maximum perfor-
mance on a task cannot be overconfident: e.g., a student that re-
ceives an exam grade of A+ cannot produce an estimate of a higher
grade; symmetrically, individuals that achieve minimum perfor-
mance can not be underconfident. Second, some individuals can
appear to be under-confident simply by chance: e.g., a student an-
swering a multiple choice question can select the correct answer by
chance and simply appear to be more skillful than they really are.
This effect does not apply symmetrically to over-confidence: a stu-
dent knowing the answers to a multiple choice question is much
less likely to select the incorrect answer by chance and appear
less skillful than in reality. This asymmetry alone could explain
why underconfidence can appear to be more common than over-
confidence. Acknowledging that such limitations naturally apply
to our setting as well, we refrain from making any claims regarding
the relative propensity of under- and over-confidence from the data
depicted in Figure 1.
4. CONFIDENCE IN TEAM INTERACTION
The promise of group over individual deliberation lies in the
intuitive notion that the more people we bring together, the more
ideas for solving a problem will be generated, and the more ideas
generated, the more likely one of them will provide an excellent
Figure 1: Misalignment between competence and confidence.
For each correctness level: the fraction of players who are un-
derconfident, at right level of confidence, and overconfident.
More competent individuals are less likely to be overconfident.
solution [19, 26, 39]. Ideally, this process could lead to a collective
performance that surpasses what individuals can achieve on their
own, i.e., the interaction will have a synergistic effect.7.
In practice, however, this “sum greater than the parts” promise
is far from guaranteed [31]. The process through which solutions
surface is complex and relies on constant negotiation between the
participants, and “process losses” [35] can also occur. While in an
ideal setting the more competent individuals would have a larger
say, in many realistic scenarios the actual level of competence on a
new task is unknown. The decision-making process is then driven
in part by self-estimations of competence (which, as we have dis-
cussed above, can be heavily misaligned with actual competence),
and decisions made through heuristics relying on such estimates
can be worse than desired [2]. In this section we examine what
are the consequences of confidence (mis)alignment on the decision-
making process, on the degree of resulting synergy and on the over-
all dynamics of the discussion.
4.1 Confidence and relative influence
When a team makes a decision, different individuals can con-
tribute to the proposed solution to different degrees. Here we ex-
amine the role confidence plays in regulating the relative influence
different team members have on the final decision.
Relative influence. In our setting, we can estimate the influence on
the team decision by considering how much closer to her individual
guess the player has managed to get the team guess to be, relative
to the other player. More formally, we define influence of a given
player p1 (with answer Gp1 ) on a team answer Gteam relative to
p2 (with answer Gp2 ) by:
inf (p1, p2) =
dist(Gp2 , Gteam)
dist(Gp2 , Gteam) + dist(Gp1 , Gteam)
,
noting that this measure of relative influence is agnostic to how
correct the solution is.
7See also the related concepts of collective intelligence [40] and
assembly bonus effect [10].
Figure 2: The larger the difference in correctness between the
best and the worst player, the more relative influence the best
player has on the final decision. A difference in correctness
of 0 corresponds to the case when all team members were at
the same level of correctness; in this case the “best” and the
“worst” player have equal contributions (i.e., relative influence
of 0.5), as expected since their roles are randomly assigned.
Throughout, error bars indicate standard error.
For each team, we pair the player who achieved the highest level
of correctness with the player that has the lowest level. Importantly,
in cases in which all players have the same level of correctness,
best and worst players are arbitrarily chosen. For each team, we
compute how much more control the best player has over the team
decision relative to the worse player, i.e., inf (pbest,pworst).8
Controlling for correctness. As previously discussed, in order for
the team discussions to be productive, it is desirable to have the
more competent member take more control and guide the team in
their decisions. It is comforting to see that, indeed, the best player
has a greater relative influence on the team solution than the worse
player in the team: Figure 2 shows that the larger the difference
in correctness between the best player and worst player, the more
relative influence the best player has on the final decision.
Given that confidence and correctness are, at least to some ex-
tent, correlated (ρ = 0.46, p-value < 0.001), it is important to con-
trol for the difference in correctness in order to disentangle the ef-
fect of confidence. To this end, we group games based on the four
possible values of the difference in correctness and we compare the
effect of confidence within these correctness-controlled groups.
Effects on relative influence. By comparing across correctness-
controlled groups (columns) in Figure 3, we observe that on av-
erage the more confident the best player is relative to the worst
player, the greater her influence on the final decision. Notably, this
trend also holds even when the team members are equally correct
(see first column, where “best” and “worst” roles are randomly as-
signed; ρ = 0.21, p-value< 0.001). Beyond competence, confidence
gives people unjustifiably greater control in the decision-making
process.
4.2 Confidence and team performance
When combined with the observation that non-competent indi-
viduals are likely to overestimate their competence (Section 3), the
result we just discussed suggests that misalignment between the
competence and confidence of team members can prevent teams
from achieving their potential. Driven by overconfidence, the least
8For clarity we focus our analysis on the best and worst players
in the team. The majority (> 60%) of the games only have two
players.
Figure 3: The more confident the best player is relative to the
worst player, the more influence (darker color) she has on the
decision, even after controlling for difference in correctness
(comparing across columns). Spearman’s correlation coeffi-
cients are computed using all data points within a group and
are indicated, together with corresponding significance levels,
for each column and row. Throughout, buckets with less than
15 instances are discarded. Statistical significance levels are in-
dicated as: *: p < 0.05, **: p < 0.01, ***: p < 0.001.
competent individuals can take control of the decision process, with
harmful effects on the team outcome.
Measuring team synergy. While many studies use correctness of
the team answer as an indication of team performance [9, 14], this
type of measure neglects differences in initial team composition:
when a team of A students is doing better than a team of C students,
it does not automatically mean they have collaborated better. Here
we focus instead on measuring how much a team improves over the
potential of its members.
To measure such improvement, or synergy, for a team of n play-
ers, we first compare the distance between the team guess Gteam
and the true answer Ltrue to the average of distances between each
player’s individual guess to the true location. This gives the team a
constructiveness score [31], which provides a control for the initial
individual performance of the players in the team:
cavg =
1
n
n∑
i=1
dist(Gpi , Ltrue)− dist(Gteam, Ltrue).
In our setting, however, a team whose average guess is already
close to the true location will have smaller maximum possible cavg
compared to teams that are farther from the correct answer. This
can happen either when a puzzle is relatively easy or when a team
is composed of particularly strong players. To account for this, we
normalize the average score of the individuals in the team to obtain
a team synergy score:
savg =
cavg
1
n
∑n
i=1 dist(Gpi , Ltrue)
.
Higher values indicate greater team improvement over the individ-
ual performance of the team members. We note that this measure
can take negative values if the team’s performance is worse than
the average performance of its members.
Effects of confidence misalignment. To test our intuition that mis-
alignment between competence and confidence can be harmful to
the decision-making process, we first consider the 227 teams where
Figure 4: When there is a real distinction between the best and
the worst player (difference in correctness > 0), the more con-
fident the best player is relative to the worst player, the greater
synergy the team achieves (darker color), controlling for differ-
ence in correctness (comparing across columns).
the worst player is overconfident to the point that she is more con-
fident than the best player. We find that 37% of these teams have
negative synergy, compared to only 26% of the rest of the teams
(2-proportion z-test p-value < 0.001).
To explore the effect of misalignment more systematically, we
compare the difference in confidence level of the best and the worst
player, after controlling for correctness (Figure 4). Since we de-
fined synergy as a symmetric team-based measure, we do not ex-
pect to observe any effect of confidence when the team members
are equally correct (first column). In all other cases, we notice
that the larger the difference in confidence between the best and the
worst player, the more productive the team discussion is: the player
with the best solution is likely to lead the team towards better re-
sults. In particular, teams where the confidence and correctness are
misaligned such that the difference in correctness is larger than the
difference in confidence — i.e., the cells above the main diagonal
(where difference in confidence equals difference in correctness)
— exhibit on average lower average synergy. This suggests that
misalignment in confidence can be harmful to group discussions,
preventing groups from reaching their potential in terms of perfor-
mance.
4.3 How confidence mediates team interactions
The effects of confidence on team performance are intriguing,
considering that we control for the actual competence of the indi-
viduals. We now turn to examine the mechanisms through which
confidence mediates group interactions, focusing on a dimension of
conversational dynamics that is particularly pertinent in the decision-
making process: the introduction and discussion of ideas [31, 42].
We consider two possible hypotheses that could explain the ob-
served effects of confidence-competence alignment:
Hyp 1 More-confident individuals contribute more ideas. If the best
individual is also the most confident one, the team benefits
from having better quality ideas to consider in order to make
steady progress to better solutions.
Hyp 2 Ideas introduced by less-confident individuals are easier to
discard. If competence and confidence are aligned, this can
help the team focus on the ideas introduced by the more com-
petent individuals.
Figure 5: The more confident the best player is, the more ideas
she introduces (relative to the worst player). Horizontal dashed
line indicates equal contribution of ideas by the best and worst
player. Vertical dashed line indicates the case when best and
worst individuals are equally confident. Significance level for
Spearman’s correlation coefficient is indicated for each differ-
ence in correctness level (each line).
To gather valid ideas for a particular puzzle, we consider all
nouns, proper nouns and adjectives that are not stopwords as can-
didate ideas. If any of these candidate ideas has been adopted (i.e.,
mentioned by at least two different participants) by any team at-
tempting the respective puzzle it is included in the set of ideas for
that puzzle. Example ideas discussed in the game illustrated in Ta-
ble 1 include “sheep”, “alps” and “arid”. We also add to this puzzle-
specific collection a set of geographical terms,9 such as “Nepal”, to
provide better coverage of potential ideas. While we find this sim-
ple method effective for our particular setting, we acknowledge that
more sophisticated methods for detecting, representing and track-
ing ideas are an important direction for future work (Section 7).
To investigate the effect of relative confidence on the number of
new ideas a player introduces to a discussion, we compare the ra-
tio between the number of ideas introduced by the best player and
the number of ideas introduced by the worst player, controlling for
difference in correctness. We find that the more confident the best
player is relative to her teammate (larger difference in confidence),
the more ideas she tend to introduce relative to their teammates
(Figure 5). Particularly noticeable is the case where there is no
difference in correctness between team players (difference in cor-
rectness = 0, p-value < 0.001): the more confident, but equally
correct, individual still introduces more ideas.
It may be conceivable that the difference in number of ideas
introduced may simply be explained by confident players talking
more during the games. Yet, there is no clear correlations between
number of words spoken and player confidence, indicating that it is
the ideas in the chat messages that are more important.
Since our setting also allows players to suggest solutions by mov-
ing the team marker during the discussion, we also examine marker
movements as an alternative means of understanding the dynamics
of the decision-making process that is less sensitive to the noise in-
herent to extracting ideas from natural language. We observe sim-
ilar trends as in the case of idea introduction: the more confident
the best player is relative to her worst teammate, the more she con-
tributes to team’s marker movements (Figure 6).
Together, these results support the first hypothesis linking confi-
dence with conversational dynamics: confidence seems to regulate
9Source: Wikipedia’s glossary of geography terms.
Figure 6: The more confident the best player is, the more
marker movements she makes relative to the worst player. Hor-
izontal dashed line indicates equal marker placements.
the exchange of ideas in decision-making discussions, such that the
more-confident individuals introduce more ideas.
The effect of confidence in filtering and selecting ideas in teams
is less clear. We find no significant correlation between the level of
confidence and the percentage of ideas that are eventually adopted
by other team members.
5. LINGUISTIC CUES OF CONFIDENCE
So far we have discussed how confidence mediates team inter-
action and performance. However, in online chats, the only means
that a person (or a system) has to judge or estimate the confidence
of another is by picking up cues from what the other person says.
Therefore, in this section we ask whether there are linguistic cues
that are indicative of an individual’s confidence. Motivated by our
previous results, we focus on identifying signals that can not simply
be explained by actual competence.
We formulate this exploration as a paired prediction task: given
a pair of equally competent teammates, can we predict from their
language which one is more confident? If such predictive signals
exist, it follows that confidence — rather than competence alone —
can influence how people talk when collaborating.
Analyzing the language of the conversations is complicated by
the fact that utterances tend to be short texts that are sprinkled
with misspellings and abbreviations common in online chats; see
Table 1 for an example chat and the last two columns of Table 4
for additional example utterances from individual players. To find
particularly predictive language signals, we consider three types of
features and analyze their strength in predicting confidence.
Word choice (bag of words, or BOW). We expect that an indi-
vidual’s choice of words conveys hints as to her confidence level.
In order to find predictive word choices that are generalizable to
other, non-geography scenarios, we discard words that are tagged
as nouns (e.g., “continent”), proper nouns (e.g., “Canada”), adjec-
tives (e.g., “Portuguese”) and a set of manually identified adverbs
and verbs.10 We also discard words that appear in only one puzzle.
This filtering process leaves us a vocabulary size of 474 words.
Ideas. Figure 5 suggests that an individual’s confidence level
is reflected in the number of ideas she brings into the discussion,
10A manual scan suggests that these three word types do indeed
cover the majority of geography-related terms, which is our intent,
although helpful domain-independent cues such as the adjective
“sure” may unfortunately be excluded by this procedure as well.
where our notion of “ideas” was defined above in Section 4.3. Be-
cause it may be the case that when ideas are introduced may also
indicate an individual’s confidence, in addition to (1) the total num-
ber of ideas introduced during the entire game, we also consider
the number of ideas introduced at two special stages: (2) before
the start of the discussion, when a player can provide a reason for
her initial individual guess (recall that this explanation is made in-
stantly available to the other teammates once the team phase com-
mences); and (3) at the very early stages of the conversation (i.e.,
within each player’s first three utterances).
Additional indicators. We also examine the use of hedges and
expressions of agreement, both of which are, intuitively, cues for
lack of confidence. Hedges, which are expressions of uncertainty or
lack of commitment, have been studied extensively in the linguis-
tics literature (a classic reference is [24]), and identifying hedging
is an active area of NLP research [13]. We adopt a list of hedg-
ing terms [37], such as “apparently” or “in my opinion”, created by
by manual curation of prior collections [13, 16, 18]. We consider
agreement cues because their occurrence potentially indicates that
the speaker was not too confident in their own opinions; we use the
list of agreement cues from [31].
To set up our competence-controlled paired prediction task, we
match the most and least confident players in a team (not allowing
ties) only if the two players are equally correct in their individ-
ual guesses.11 This results in 747 matched pairs from 216 unique
puzzles. Pair features are simply obtained by taking the difference
between the feature values for each of the two players, e.g., for
idea features, we take the number of ideas introduced by the first
player in the pair subtracted by the number of ideas introduced by
the second player in the pair.
We use logistic regression and evaluate performance using a leave-
one-puzzle-out approach: in each fold, we reserve instances from
one puzzle as the test set and train on instances from all other puz-
zles; this further controls for effects of puzzle-specific cues. We re-
port accuracies macro-averaged by puzzle, such that performance
on each puzzle has equal weight regardless of how many instances
it contains.
With our setup, both random guessing and using correctness as a
predictor would yield 50% accuracy. The length of the utterances,
i.e., the number of words a player speaks, is also found not to do
better than random guessing.
BOW features can predict significantly better than chance or
correctness alone (binomial test p-value < 0.001), with a macro-
average accuracy of 58%. This suggests that there are indeed lin-
guistic signals that are predictive of the difference in confidence
between equally-competent teammates. We also note that adding
the additional indicators does not bring noticeable improvement.
Notably, the three ideas features can on their own perform signif-
icantly better than chance or correctness (p-value< 0.001), achiev-
ing 60% macro-averaged accuracy. While all idea introduction fea-
tures have positive coefficients (i.e., introducing more ideas signals
more confidence), the order of relative importance of these features
suggests that the early stages of the conversation are particularly
indicative of relative confidence:
feature type coef.
number of ideas in reason 1.05
number of ideas in first 3 utterances 1.05
number of ideas overall 0.50
11To account for data sparsity and simplify the task we group the
two highest confidence levels together. We also considered the task
of detecting absolute, rather than relative, confidence and obtained
qualitatively similar results.
Table 4: Linguistic cues for confidence, placed in post-hoc categories. The “more-confident” and “less-confident” columns list words
that are among the top 30 features in at least half the test folds; daggers mark words that are among the top 10 features in at least
half the test folds. In the example utterances, word of the type represented by the row are shown in bold.
category more-confident less-confident more-confident example less-confident example
personal pron. we me, you† i think we just go upin the mountains looks like thailand to me.
interrogatives which how, what
†,
where, why
i found some writing which
looked mandarin what do you think ?
thinking (tense) think thought, thinking† i think it is nearer to the
ocean
i was thinking brazil too
hedges and modals probably, maybe,might, should, can guess, could it might be too far north lol i guess so
certainty 100[%], actually,pretty [sure]
i’m pretty sure this is
a nordic country
agreement too, sounds [good] ahh sounds good to me
negations not† no†, dont its definetly not that side i have no idea
coordinating conj. and†, but building style and cars are alsoquite uk ish
subordinating conj. though, as† though it could be aforgotten part of Italy
demonstrative pron. these, there†, this that†, thats trust me on this one! lets try that one
articles the† look at the statues
filler words ah, haha† no clue haha
others
it, is†, its†, by, from,
in†, on†, somewhere†
found, said, saw†,
far, move
for, about, have†, did†,
do, lets, looks, makes,
put, near, all, your
5.1 Linguistic features of interest
In order to understand possible sources of confidence signals be-
yond the introduction of ideas, we now look at the BOW linear re-
gression coefficients. Table 4 shows words that ranked among the
top 30 features in at least half of the folds, grouped into post-hoc
categories to emphasize several distinctions between the language
used by more-confident vs. less-confident individuals.
In terms of the use of personal pronouns (first row of Table 4),
more confident individuals are more likely to speak on behalf of the
team, whereas less confident individuals tend to stick more with
first and second person perspectives. Interestingly, this echoes in
part findings showing that in small groups leaders are generally
more other-focused, preferring first-person plural to first-person
singular [7, 21]. In this regard, more confident individuals seem
to assume an ad-hoc leadership role (even when they are equally-
competent).
On the other hand, less confident players tend to consult others’
opinions more, as indicated by the increased use of interrogatives
(second row). We also note that “did” and “do” categorized under
“others” are mostly used in questions involving such interrogatives.
When expressing thoughts (third row), less confident individuals
tend to use past tense,12 which might be an indication that they
perceive themselves as less authoritative members in the dialogue,
according to some studies in linguistics [20].
The patterns for features that are intuitively, or at least anecdo-
tally, associated with confidence, such as hedging, certainty and
12In these chats, past continuous tense (“was thinking”) is more
prevalent than present continuous tense (“am thinking”).
agreement, are listed in the second block of rows in Table 4. These
patterns do not align completely with common intuition.
More confident individuals do indeed tend to use more phrases
indicating certainty, and express less agreement with other’s opin-
ions. On the other hand, hedges and modal verbs, are not necessar-
ily reserved to the less confident people. For instance, “might” and
“probably” are associated with the more confident people; one hy-
pothesis worth exploring further is that confident individuals make
use of certain types of hedges as a strategy to gently persuade their
partners [38].
There are also interesting differences in terms of the surface
structure of the utterances (third block) with more confident indi-
viduals being more likely to use coordinating conjunctions and the
definite article “the”, potentially in an attempt to bring more con-
crete evidence into the discussion. On the other hand, the utterances
of less confident individuals are sprinkled with filler words.
This shallow post-hoc analysis of words signaling confidence (or
lack thereof) can serve as a starting point for future work on more
complex linguistic and conversational features for confidence de-
tection. The fact that such predictive cues exist even in a setting that
controls for competence underlines the role confidence has in shap-
ing people’s language in group discussions. Furthermore, this sug-
gests that future interfaces for facilitating group decision-making
could potentially extract confidence information from the language
of the participants.
6. ADDITIONAL RELATED WORK
Confidence has been studied as a factor affecting human behav-
ior. Horowitz [17] has shown that there is a significant negative
correlation between a person’s level of imitation behavior and the
difference between the person’s confidence relative to others. Con-
fidence as approximated by poll scores is shown to correlate with
how frequent candidates shift topics in political debates [32]. In the
group opinion forming processes, highly confident individuals have
been identified as one of the two major attractors of opinion [29],
based on simulations on models derived from controlled experi-
ments. However, most of these these experiments merely present
participants the opinions and confidence levels of others, without
allowing any real interactions between them.
The correlation between confidence and correctness has been
studied in many contexts. Studies relating the confidence of eye-
witness to the actual correctness [4] and self-reported confidence
to observed competence of junior medical officers [3] both indi-
cate important problems with the use of confidence as a predictor
of correctness. Miscalibration has been noted for a long time, with
most studies focusing on overconfidence [1, 11, 23]. See Moore
and Healy [28] for a reconciliation of existing studies on overcon-
fidence.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Our main contribution in this paper is to investigate pre-existing
and new research questions regarding the effects of confidence,
particularly when misaligned with correctness, on group decision-
making and group discussions, doing so at a large scale and in a
natural online setting.
Our results, as well as the limitations of our setting, point natu-
rally to several directions for future work:
Confidence prediction and miscalibration detection. In our
explorations of possible linguistic cues of confidence, we simplified
matters by binarizing confidence labels (more confident vs. less
confident) and applying basic cue-extraction techniques. Given that
we do discover that there are signals in language that capture confi-
dence, one natural extension is to aim at more accurately predicting
confidence at a finer-grained level, perhaps by applying more so-
phisticated natural language processing techniques. We could build
on such work to address the more ambitious goal of detecting mis-
alignment between confidence and correctness, with the eventual
aim of facilitating group discussion by ameliorating the effects of
under- and over-confidence on team conversations and outcomes.
Finer-grained measures of confidence and competence. In
this work, we discretized players’ confidence and competence us-
ing four coarse levels. As discussed in Section 3, this discretization
allows us to identify clear cases of under- and over-confidence. In
future work, finer-grained measures of confidence and competence
might enable better controls, while providing a more detailed anal-
ysis of the extent of confidence-competence (mis)alignment effects
in team interactions.
Dynamics of team discussions. We have looked into conversa-
tional dynamics in terms of idea introduction and selection, where
we employed a simple heuristic to track ideas. Pursuing better
methods of representing ideas, capturing idea introduction, identi-
fying idea adoption, and further distinguishing good and bad ideas
would be beneficial in further understanding the dynamics of dis-
cussions.
On a related note, in this work we have only considered the ini-
tial confidence of individual players. Studies have looked into how
individual confidence combines to form eventual dyadic confidence
in collaborative decisions [33], and it would be interesting to track
and understand how individuals’ confidence in their own guess and
in their team’s working solution changes over time.
Causality. We have revealed correlations between confidence
and influence in teams, as well as between confidence and team
synergy arising from interaction. Our full control over the game
interface gives us the ability to conduct experiments involving the
introduction of stimuli that artificially manipulate individuals’ con-
fidence levels; this ability opens the possibility of studying not just
correlation, but also causality.
Confidence in other decision-making contexts. Will our find-
ings generalize beyond StreetCrowd? While we have striven to ana-
lyze our data in a non-domain specific fashion, studying the effects
of confidence in team decision-making in other contexts, such as
group work in Massive Open Online Courses, or in the process of
eRulemaking, is an important direction for future work.
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